

I met Ahmed Rami in Marbella, Andalusia, Spain, in the home of the exiled then 82-year-old Major General Otto Ernst Remer.On first impression their friendship seemed to rest on contradictions. On the one hand there was the tall old German World War Two officer, highly decorated (Knights Cross with Oak Leaves) - wounded eleven times, 48 close combats - the professional German soldier, raised in the Prussian tradition, who had put down the 20 July 1944 assassination attempt on his head of state, Adolf Hitler.
On the other hand, there was former tank lieutenant of the Moroccan army, Ahmed Rami, son of a proud but poor Berber sheik, who as a young officer wished to depose his head of state, King Hassan of Morocco, in the spirit of Swiss folk hero William Tell.
A closer comparison of these so different personalities reveals their similarity: Resistant to all temptations, both are incorruptible idealists who have no understanding for the material rules of the "western consumer society" game. Chivalrous, and at all times prepared to serve the good as did once Don Quichotte, they are prepared to sacrifice themselves for their people's cause.
A strong code of honour marked their actions and both wished to serve their people, the one in 1944 and the other in 1972.
Remer knew that on 20 July 1944 the majority of Germans supported Hitler, that is, his regime was legitimate.
Ahmed Rami was convinced that the King of Morocco was a puppet of the jewish power and of the CIA who unashamedly exercised power against his people. State power was therefore illegitimate.
Remer defended his head of state as he was attacked, and Rami attacked his head of state whom he was called on to defend. Both were motivated by a love for their countries and the loyalty for their peoples.
It is the first of two messages in this book.
There are situations where the soldier must make a choise betwen duty to defend the head of stat and the duty to defend his peuple.
A soldier, like any citizen, is bound to serve his people (democracy), and so also to the executive power of his state, as long as this power's legitimacy emanates from the sovereignty of the people. If, however, the government acts against the will of its people, then it is every soldier's duty to resist such power.
Wherever an illigimate regime which harms its people by retaining power through violence and oppression, cunning and deception, then it is the duty of the armed forces of that country to oppose such government. Such a criminal form of government needs to be arrested by the armed forces and put before the country's courts of law.
And this is the second message of the book: At a time in which the "American" world order has declared war against the self determination of peoples, and by means of its international monetary system and media hegemony, prevents the peoples of Africa, Europe and Asia, to achieve unison within their national boundaries respective peoples. Each country cannot alone liberate itself. The global threat to nations, their people (democracy) can only be realized globally.
The rights, for instance, of the Albanians, Hutus, Tutsis, and Palestinians: all need to be a part of all humanity´s struggle. All resistant peoples should see each other as natural allies.
Hatred, force and ethnic cleansing never originate where self-determination, freedom and justice are guaranteed.
The jewish power´s empire has during a past one hundred-year war period opposed national self-determination. With its controlled U.S government it has totally dominated and oppressed the people of the United States. Through its international monetary system, with the aid of the media hegemony, it has now become a deadly danger for all peoples through the world.
This danger, which in its own nature is a global one, can thus only be defeated globally.
The white man, the black man, the yellow man and the red man must unite globally against the international jewish money power.
A Moroccan from the Atlas Mountains who fights for the self-determination of Palestinians as well as for the free speech of Germans, is our teacher, if he attacks those who put themselves above peoples.
Ahmed Rami will always fight for the rights of political prisoners and the persecuted, such as Faurisson, Remer, Walendy, Deckert, Kemper, Lachout and countless others.
The artistic nature of Rami's language is that of the Koran itself. After all, as a child from Atlas Mountains, he was steeped in it.
Listen to the story of the barefooted boy who emerged from the valleys of the high Atlas Mountains, assured of his message, then onto the road for Casablanca, there to learn to read and write.
From poverty to become an incorruptible freedom fighter, and whose exiled voice gives hope to his people. And now I invite Ahmed Rami to speak.
Webmaster
by
Ahmed Rami
On the 10 July 1971 some units from the Moroccan army, shattered the calm of a garden-party being given by King Hassan II in the outskirts of Rabat by suddenly appearing and machine-gunning some of the guests, occupied the main radio station and proclaimed the republic. However, after a series of episodes, the soldiers gave up arid those in charge of the incident: officers, generals and officials, were shot.
The most common reaction to the events of la July 1971 was one of surprise. Even If the Morrocan monarchy did not appear to be any more protected from an attack than the other Arab monarchies, the attack, when it came, was from an unexpected area. It was known that Mohamed V, then Hassan II had done their utmost to keep the armed forces under their direct control and to avoid giving them any ground for complaint. It is also supposed that they kept careful watch over the allegiance of their officials. Surprise actions may of course have arisen from this area: these would have been expected from the lower ranks and not from the senior officers. The revolutions In Egypt, Iraq and in Libya were brought about by the captains and not the generals. These same captains, coming from and remaining close to the people thanks to their modest salaries, were inspired by an Islamic ideology. What possible ideology could have roused those generals and colonels of 10 July, pampered by the regime?
These sated men bore daily witness to a luxuary infinitely surpassing that which they were granted. Did these men, decorated but under the thumb of one who exercised absolute authority, rear up in retaliation? Did they want more than wealth and honours in imitation of a great many officers from the Arab countries? The answer to these questions lies perhaps in the file on the Interrogations which preceded the executions. The answer will be brought to light before long.
If the secret concerning the leaders of the conspiracy is to remain so for the time being, could not the motivatIons of those involved and their helpers be re-enacted? By "helpers" we take here to mean those who indirectly took part by the very fact that they remained silent. For a great deal of silence or tacit complicity would be required for this armed column to reach Ahermoumou In Skhirat, crossing Fès, Meknès and Rabat, without the king, at any time, being warned of this. The attitude of those Involved was explained by King Hassan II in two contradictory ways: They were said to be drugged; their commanding officers were also said to have persuaded them into believing that a plot was afoot to overthrow the king and that it was their duty to protect or rescue him.
We do not believe In drugs. These doubtlessly enable a person to ignore danger and not to act contrary to his deep feelings. The witnesses who testified concerning this were of course trustworthy, but based their case solely on the abnormal elation which made them appear as marauders in their behaviour. This Is to forget that an outburst of extreme violence, hate, rebellion or paIn can create the same effects as drugs. Those who saw the hysterical crowd at Nasser's funeral could also have believed in the power of drugs.
On the other hand, difficult though it may be not Imagine, these young people were taken for conspirators reunited with hostile Intentions against the king and the group of high-ranking civil servants, ambassadors and foreigners who with champagne-filled glasses or plates of smoked salmon in hand, filled the palace of SkhIrat. Even supposing that some of them had been fooled, the others, i.e. those who had then gone to proclaim the republic on Radio Morocco, had certainly not been fooled. It is the state of mind of this group of people which it would appear interesting to understand.
When such a coup hits a regime it is only normal to look for its cause In the opposition group. Here, nobody would have expected a military coup and Hassan II himself, while establishing a tenuous link between the criticisms levelled against the opposition and the attempted military coup, has publicly declared that the opposition (and even the friends of those accused in Marrakesh) were responsible neither for its conception nor for Its planning.
It is known that the Istiqlal party remained monarchist. The standpoint of the UNFP is somewhat more complex: If It Is officially monarchist (how could It publicly profess to be otherwise?). It is convinced that the monarchy constitutes the safest defence of the "Islamic Feudal System" which one wishes to quash and the main obstacle to the coming of the "socialist" regime where "the sole solution" to the economic and social problems facing the country is seen. The other "legal" political parties are only the King's marionettes and play the role of opposition.
This badly organized and weak opposition represents but a small part of the real opposition In Morocco. All those who have some contact with young people at school, students and secondary school pupils, know just what are the feelings of this age group regarding not only the system but also to the person of the king himself. It cannot be ignored that the investigators of the Skhirat incident were young people, and, if not intellectuals, could at least have been men of a certain academic ability. (The level of the school at Ahermoumou is obviously far from that of the level required at the University.)
What then thinks the youth of Morocco? It would take too long to describe this in its entirety. However, even there, unanimity is not the order of the day. Some see the solution in an Islamic order while others aspire to an "Arabic Socialism". However, all have misgivings about their future and are deeply vexed by the contrast existing between the affluence of a few and the poverty of the greater number.
One suspects that the cadets of Ahermoumou, who carried out the Skhlrat coup (and the rebels of the coup of 16 August 1972) were moved by an exact Ideology. Their radio reporters have as yet not presented their programme. Even if they had uttered the word socialism, this would not have meant very much. Was not the first governing party in the first Moroccan parliament called the "Socialist Democratic Party"? But one does not, without being moved by powerful emotions, give oneself up to acts of violence such as were demonstrated at Skhirat.
Among the details reported by the eye-witnesses concerning the scenes of 10 July, one in particular struck us. The soldiers who were searching the king's guests did not take money, however snatched luxury goods such as jewellery and golden lighters, threw them onto the ground and stamped on them as If possessed by a certain frenzy.
This small detail may be linked to a larger one, so large that it is spoken of from Algiers to Tunis, to Paris and as far away as Washington and one is unable to go to Morocco without hearing it spoken of many times a day by Moroccans and by foreigners alike. The "It" refers to corruption (cf. speech by the King on 4 August 1971). "The Bakchich Empire" is universal and the underdevelopment gives it more favourable ground than elsewhere. In a poor country, power has often been the single and most sure source of wealth. But Morocco seems to have broken some sort of record here, If not on a world scale - at least by Maghrebi and perhaps even Arab standards. (In the vastness of Asia everything Is on a much larger scale.) In the first half of 1971 scandals proliferated. Just as the monarch was about to leave the country on an official visit things were to go further before the U S Government expressed the wish for the trip to be postponed due to corruption Involving so many high-ranking Moroccan individuals that the affair had to be covered up. And was not It General Madbouh who brought back from Washington this unhappy piece of news, with, It Is reported, "proof of guilt" in hand.
The same Madbouh was a privileged among privileged according to Hassan II himself. But who had done such a thing to him and his accomplices of the 10 July 1971 and all the other privileged? Nobody thought that in Morocco these atrocities could be committed unbeknown to the King and against his will. One gained moreover the impression that despite a few rare and spectacular sanctions against the "atrocities wIthin the atrocity" that it was a question of a system of government aimed at alIgning Itself to the ruling class and levelling by its seductions, people of worth especially young people whom the opposition risked inveigling.
Such an outstanding Morrocan student, Trotskylst or Maoist though he may have been, when attending the University of Paris or Stockholm, was found to be an able top civil servant, complete with villa in Souissl (the select residential of Rabat), and complete with a bank account In Zürich. Yes, it's true. And how were the large union powers and leaders of the working masses able to bring about the revolution while driving about in palace-given cars? Yes, that's also true.
However, disadvantages as well as advantages were part and parcel of the system. Those men who had a wealth of experience about Morocco and In front of whom, before the 10 July, we confessed our doubts concerning the effectiveness of this policy and the future of the regime to which we had entrusted ourselves, repelled to us that this had lasted for centuries and that the average Moroccan continued to link in his mind strength and wealth and that those who themselves had become incensed at the corrüption were at the same time ready to give in to this temptation should It ever come their way.
Two historical errors, it seemed to us, weakened this argument. First of all this argument failed to take note of the most ancient Islamic traditions, viz. the contempt for possessions which exemplify the riches of this world. Down through the ages, reformers rose up to denounce the rich and powerful (the two being synonymous) and from time to time involved the indigent masses In a sort of revolutionary crusade. The history of the Moslem World is not without its Savonarolas. Their role, if equally marked, at the time when the works concerning religious purification were about to make their re-appearance and whose authors did not delay in yielding to the same temptations which had been the undoing of their predecessors. Even in Morocco these reformers came from the South, for the most part a country of drought and poverty:
Almoravides, Almohades and even in the twentieth century EI-Hiba etc. Today these southern men, Berbers or Arabs (of what significance is race here?), make camp at the gates of the towns: they populate almost a third of the shanty towns of the larger communities.
The second error fails to take note of the serious changes which have affected modern Morocco. This year there are a million and a half children in our schools almost all of whom learn French. For these ancient civilisations there exist no "Great Wall of China" for their protection. The old man, of course, has not entirely disappeared and Skhirat, while assuming a Maghrebl air, no longer remains what it once was. The poverty stricken peasant-become-sultan of traditional folklore was the only conceivable representation of poverty overcome. Today it is known, even in the shanty towns, that other methods of overcoming poverty exist, examples of which have been provided by entire nations. In former times, of the rich man it was said: "God for him has provided". Nowadays this is no longer the case of all the rich. Indeed, some quite simply see themselves as equated with thieves. Young impoverished school leavers who can neither hope for a post in the administration (because 7096 of the employees are under 40 years of age) nor can they hope for work in the private sector because a hundred to a hundred and ten posts were created during the years of plenty, when, actually, double this would have been required simply to come to terms with the demographic explosion. How could they nurture a sentiment other than hate for the recipients of such wanton and doubtfully acquired luxury?
March 1965 saw the inhabitants of Casablanca's shanty towns take action. Such was the repression of their actions, according to a witness "that they will never take action so hastily again". Unemployment amongst academics together with rebellion by graduates produced a danger more Insidious and an explosive potential of an even greater magnitude. Was there nothing they could do against armoured vehicles? And herein lies the reasons why the revolutions of the Third World did not have their origin in the suburbs as did those in the Europe of the XIX century but rather had their inception in military camps.
One further element seems worthy of mention In the illogical train of events of that mad day when acts of violence were aimed against foreigners which is a singular occurrence in Morocco, nationals of which display a keenly developed sense of hospitality although It has otherwise been stated. When these acts of violence were perpetrated for example in 1907, 1912 and from 1953-55, they took the form of struggles, all be they threatened or opposed, In a bid for Independence. Think of the visitors to Skhlrat; ambassadors, doctors, businessmen etc. who had been treated in a like fashion, nay verily, slain by a hail of machine-gun fire. This would not have been made known and certainly not justified but would be explained in a manner devoid of any feeling however brief or powerful.
For a full understanding, some method of recapitulation is required. Political Independence does not automatically guarantee economic independence, especially when modern industry, which is the key to development, remains In the hands of the onetime colonialist who brought or Instigated the aforementioned Industry. Socialistic countries have solved the problem by nationalization. in Morocco, a country which has chosen the Liberal option (in the economic sense of the term), it was necessary in order to guarantee this independence that the national upper classes replaced the foreign capitalists. It is a known fact that the upper classes did not wish to or could not carry this out. Unlike their European predecessors of the XVIII century these rare and mighty merchants did not change Into "capitalist entrepreneurs". With regard to long-term investment In Industry, they preferred to invest in the short term and to speculate on the markets or certain "stakes" such as land, property, gold, jewellery and leaving foreign investors the benefits but also the risks of industrial expansion. So flagrant was the slackness that this "Liberal" but "nationalistic" state had to intervene itself, to an ever increasing extent in the industrial investments which without the state's intervention, would almost if not entirely have been consumed by foreign capitalists. At the Inception of the NBID (the National Bank for Industrial Development), whose name clearly defines Its aims, with capital furnished partly by the state, partly by foreign groups, it was understood that 10% of all shares would be placed at the disposal of the national capitalists. The latter's policy of non-involvment was so effective that the foreign groups also had to underwrite their 1096.
The programme to Moroccanize the tertiary sector announced last year adequately satisfied the wishes of the Moroccan upper classes, comfortably installed in the shade of a secondary sector whose responsibility and risks are shared between the state and foreigners alike. The programme developed swiftly in a Guizot-like whirlwind (money is gained and quicker at that by publicity than by the making of pig iron) however the absence of those smiths who forged the industry of the France of Louis Philippe was noticeable.
The top civil servants (many of whom were themselves products of the upper classes or who were related to them through marriage) were caught in the grip of this same whirlwind. Those remaining were the ones who chose to study and consequently found their degree to be the "Open Sesame" to a veritable Aladdin's cave. The would-be Louis Philippe type upper classes hoarded their money avariciously and painstakinqly avoided any outward sign of wealth. This Bedoum tendency to vaunt, between the two extremes of starvation and wanton profligacy, Is making its comeback among the nouveau riche Morrocans: in certain milieu of the capital It is considered indelicate, nay shameful, to entertain when one does not aspire to the modest possession of a swimming-pool in the garden of their villa.
Those residing hard by the gates of splendour were subjected to an ostentatious display on the part of the redolently-opulent guests. Such people tended to confuse their envious desires with their profound contempt for those, nationals and expatriates alike, who partook of this grandeur cum splendour so far removed from the poverty of the greater number and the mediocrity of the aspiring middle classes. Given a little more instruction and information, local profiteers of the tertiary sector will come to be treated as servants of the foreign lords of the second sector. This provides Moroccan progressive magazines with a seemingly constant supply of material. The intellectuals who edit the aforementioned magazines are familiar with Marx and they denounce the upper classes, stalwarts of the regime, as compliant stooges of "Western capitalism".
The cadets of Ahermoümou have read neither Marx~ nor would they subscribe to such progressive magazines. However, they are well aware of the fact that the profits from the more eminent among the upper classes and of the dishonest civil servants are carefully deposited in the banks of capitalist countries. The ideological phase has, as yet, not been attained but remains at one of moral Indignation and nationalistic reaction. These two factors were all that was necessary to place the regime on the verge of ruin thus highlighting what we believed to be one of its maIn weaknesses.
A Frenchman living at the same time in Morocco informed us that while at the house of some Moroccan friends, hourly reports concerning the events at Skhlrat were broadcast on the radio. Joy preceded sadness and everyone took it In turns to pledge their loyalty.
A regime is labelled archaic when It does not accomodate the soclo-psychological features of the people for whom It is responsible. It is not the monarchy such as it is which is In question: archaic republics actually do exist. However, a XX century country however resilient its former strength cannot be governed as in days of yore. A Moroccan stated concerning Hassan II: "He claims to be a modern king while he at the same time rules the country in the same way as Moulay Ismail (former sultan in 1672-1727). ThIs is not possible." The "government" in Morocco of today does not consist of "ministers" in the modern sense of the word but of slaves for the king "by Divine Right" whose will and order must be obeyed and cannot be called in question.
The Divine Right of Kings has never been without its risk and disadvantages. In the complexity of the modern world, one doubts the practicality of such Divine Right. The man who reigns alone is condemned to a position of greater isolation to the point of becoming the prisoner rendered helpless by his Isolation. He longer listens to a single person and the truth can no longer be told to him." This plaint from faithful advisers has existed since time immemorial. Only a short time ago did it resound in the corridors of Morrocan palaces.
There exist "charismatic" leaders who equate the isolation of absolute power to a sort of mystical communion with their people. In the absence of highly individual gifts of native ability the ancient kings of France were given the holy unction, the Alaouite sultans were given the traditional Moroccan blessing "La Baraka". Would this have been enough In the Morocco of 1971 to guarantee a means of communication between the monarch and his people?
During the course of the days of 10 July 1971 and of 16 August 1972, onlookers were struck by near absolute passiveness of the Moroccan people. No signs of any help could be found either to support the King or to help the band of marauders. All that took place seemed to happen in a sort of ethereal vacuum far above the heads of ordinary mortals who had neither wish nor ability to give in to it. So swift was the train of events that it hardly left any time, let it be said, for the ordinary mortals to react. However, the relief brought about by the certain knowledge of the king's safety and the aborted coup ought to have ignited an explosion of elation in the "faithful people". The absence of any spontaneous reaction demonstrates once more, should there be a need for such, the cruel solitude of power absolute and corrupt.
A further, not to be ignored, aspect of the putsch exists even if its understanding might occasion some small difficulty.
This is Its aspect of berber "siba". It is an open secret that the royal armed forces contained many Berbers. Berber not only in the majority of the "second class" but also in the upper echelons of the army; the greater part of those generals shot down on 13 July 1971 were originally from the Berber people. Of course this explains itself through quite natural reasons. The lust after arms and military career remained most virulent amongst the rough mountain tribes, who are for the greater part speakers of the Berber dialect. To represent the putsch as an insurrection against the Arabs by the Berber people would be ludicrously inexact. What one is simply aiming at establishing Is that Hassan II, sensing the escalation of danger, had, it seems, reacted in a like manner to that of the threatened protectorate placed his confidence in the Berbers who were considered as the most steadfast because they were the most traditionalist and less contaminated by the poisons of modernicstic theory and modern society. Without a shadow of a doubt the "Myth of the Good Berber" has a hard life and always contains the same disappointments for those who place their trust in it.
Rarely has it been known for the Berbers to present a united front: violent clashes have always been the characteristic of clans and tribes. The King's aides-de-camp, massacred at Skhirat, were they themselves Berber. Madbouh and the ringleaders of the rebellion were not only Berber but also Riffians. It is known that the Riff tribe was roused in 1958 by the FAR (Forces Armées Royales, moroccan Royal Forces), whose prince, Moulay Hassan (Hassan II), was also the chief of staff. The repression led by the FAR caused the Riffs to suffer a period of hardship. What possible role could this memory have played, deeply entrenched but nevertheless alive, in the decisions made by the chief marauders? To determine this is all but impossible. On the other hand, what can be established with certainty is that these proud mountain tribes whose generals, decorated with military honours,were the pride and hope of their tribes who will not readily forget the image of their bodies riddled with bullets and spat upon by the riff-raff. Vendetta is a well known Berber speciality. It is however served cold.
The Riffians in "siba" (dissidence) of 1958 announced with competitive relish: "We have had enough of Fassis' goverment. The numerous inhabitants of Fès, if the truth be told, those in the corridors of power, played a simply symbolic involvment in this affair: a symbol of the town with its accumulation of wealth and luxury items, which at one and the same time raises up the desire to plunder, to hate poverty and all puritanical reprobation. Once again we come across the factors which have already been brought to light in the mysterious Skhirat affair and which allow us without any shadow of doubt to put into its correct place the detail of "sib. Berber". These Berbers are perhaps but the tip of the iceberg of this Moroccan peasant army, an army which has been raised up through the centuries against luxury and oppression in the cities and which knows furthermore that poverty is not a fatalistic decree from Allah. The instinct of these simple people is here confirmed by economic analyses: the statistics show that the increase in living standards amongst city dwellers, or let us say to be more precise, certain city dwellers, has risen at the expense of those living in rural areas.
It is often useful in understanding the origins of a political movement to consider what consequently became of it. In the case of a failure, as in this case we do not have this resource, Howover, it is not forbidden to ask oneself what the putsch would have achieved had It succeeded. This is reminiscent of the regime of the colonels In Greece. We ought to have however, for our part, given some thought to the Islamic Nasserian system. Had the bullet which killed Madboüh sped a few centimetres farther on, the Morocco of today might have been governed by a group of Islamic Nasserian officers.
Regarding the revolution at the Palace, the putsch of 10 July 1971 failed by all accounts. The reality concerning the matter, we believe, is quite different. What come to light from the stammerings of some scruffy soldiers equipped with arms and ideas were these large problems which seize Third world countries by the throat and which Morocco delayed too long in facing.
It Is true that for centuries the people of Morocco have often lived both in poverty and misery, however Death periodically swept away the excesses of her people. Today this excess is some what around 3.296 per year, which means that the population is doubling every twenty years. And these men who are no longer dying and who are no longer eating, go to school and listen to the radio: there are transistors in every tent and in the "nouala" (poor people's habitation). The era of submissiveness is at an end.
The system which collapsed politically on 10 July 1971 and on 16 August 1972 was that of the old Makhzen order, and had lasted anachronistically even as far as the middle of the XX century, during 45 years of the protectorate and 30 years of independence, consisted of directl~g the country's wealth to those In power and the "vultures" who remained close on their heals.
The economic theory which concerns development is at the same time both very Intricate and very simple. In order to produce more one must invest; to invest one must save; to save on must consume less than one produces, that is to say; to deprive oneself. Throughout the centuries the only ones to deprive themselves, and at the same time tacitly accept this, have been the poor for the most part. Today, however, they will not accept this: they accept this even less when they see a minority of privileged plunge themselves into decadence which does not even have the merit of being gainfully earned. The equability concerning this deprivation is perhaps no more than a fantastic dream. It Is necessary, nevertheless, for this inequality to be less objectionable and for the poorer for they themselves to benefit from their sacrifices which are the more hard to make.
The answer is simple but demands no less than a revolution. When revolutions are not carried out in a peaceful manner (such have existed), they are carried out amidst a surrounding of blood and destruction, where the great suffer less than the small. But the Moroccan people have no choice. For Morocco it is a question of life or death. Either the Moroccans go ahead by overthrowing the corrupted monarchy or they will succumb as an independent and free Islamic nation. In the Koran It is said that "where kings govern there corruption comes into existence and turn free people into slaveIu. Islam is originally a revolutionary ideology and movement against tyranny and hereditary monarchy.
The gateway to the future is still open. The rumblings of 10 July 1971 and of 16 August 1972 are a sure Indication that the ball has been set in motion. Hassan II and his menials will not be able to stop the course of time. The destiny that the Shah of Iran was struck by would have served as a lesson to Hassan II and to all Moroccans and foreign powers who profit by his regime.
Ahmed Rami
Box 316, 101 26 Stockholm. Sweden. Tel:+46.70-812 1240
AHMED RAMI´S REVELATIONS
CONCERNING THE COUP D'ÉTAT ATTEMPTS IN MOROCCO
(Published in the French magazine "Le Liberal", Nov.1973)
Together with Oufkir, the lieutenant of the Moroccan Royal Forces, Ahmed Rami, prepured a series of attempts on the life of Hassan II of which the last was the machine-gunning while in flight of the king's Boeing. on the 16th of August 1972. The former alde-de-camp of Oufklr, Ahmed Rami, escaped from Morocco where he is under sentence of death. A refugee In Sweden, he lives in Stockholm where he told about his extra ordinary adventure.
Prior to being one of the most promising and outstanding officers In the Military Royal Academy, he was one of the leaders of the Union Nationale des Forces Populaires (UNFP), created by Ben Barka. A young teacher of the Mohamed V senior secondary school in Casablanca, Ahmed Rami became an officer In an attempt to destroy the monarchy. It was with this aim that he accepted the post of aide-de-camp to general Oufkir. Here follows his account and his startling revelations concerning Skhlrat and the death of Oufkir:
I was born in the village of Aït Mar in Tafraoute, in the province of Agadir. I belong to the Tahala tribe.
My grandfather was the chief of the Aït Rami tribe. Aït Rami means "the family of the shooter". Before being colonized by France the royal power had no influence on our region where the tribal leaders were the law makers and fought amongst themselves. In 1935, the men of Tafraoute made a last struggle against the French soldiers who beat them at Alt Abdala.
My father, who was a simple land worker, went to look for work in Casablanca and left my mother and the five children In the village. While still quite young, I helped my mother to cultivate the difficult soil of Tafraoute. My chief task was to take pebbles from the fields in order to make it easier for the plough to pass through the soil, a simple wooden plough hardened by fire. We were so poor that I was sent away from the mosque by the "Fquih", the village teacher of the Coran, because I did not give him the customary present.
After the pacification ended, the French built a school a few kilometres from my village. The women in my village refused to send their children to the school fearing that their children would be stolen from them. And so my mother sent me to Casablanca. My arrival in this city was somewhere between 1950 and 1952. I spoke only the Berber language. I was lucky enough to find a job as a general assistant in a grocer's where I was fed and given accomodation. I slept on the floor in front of the shop counter. Two years later I was delivering newspapers and milk in the Racine quarter, an area inhabited by the French. In 1952, I went on strike to protest about the assassination of a Tunisian leader. During 1955, in Casablanca, incidents of revolt and rebellion amongst Moroccan nationalists were on the increase. I did not want to remain inactive and so with a bottle of petrol I burned a car. This fire which I had lit in the district burned for a long time during the night. I had become a freedom fighter.
At the end of 1955, like all other Moroccans, I was awaiting the return of the Sultan. The French police forces knowing that they would soon leave the country, left the way open to resistance organizations. Anarchy prevailed in Casablanca. My grocer's shop was robbed by three thugs who threatened me with a revolver.
After the declaration of independence, I became a street salesman of shirts for a Jewish business man whose daughter, who was the same age as me, taught me French.
In 1958, I returned to my village and went to the school in Tafraoute. Studying al night by the light of a candle, I obtained my certificate of studies, in Arabic and in French. Two years later, after some time spent at Tiznlt secondary school, I began studies at the Ecole Normale Sup~rieure in Casablanca. Disappointed by this independence which had put the people under the yoke of a feudal monarchy, I joined the UNFP created by Ben Barka, and I quickly became one of its leaders. After making a revolutionary speech at a meeting of the opposition, I was arrested and kept in prison for five days at Casablanca central police station.
In June 1963, I graduated from the Ecole Normale Superieure as a secondary school teacher. Appointed as a teacher of history and geography at a senior secondary school for girls in Casablanca, I was also teaching French and Arabic at the Mohamed V senIor secondary school. On 23 March 1965, a student demonstration brought about a riot in Casablanca. Our main enemy Oufklr, the minister of the Interior, was directing the repressive control aboard a helicopter. The army shot at the demonstrators. The dead numbered about 400.
The next day1 police in civilian clothing arrested me at the Ecole normale. They put handcuffs on me, blindfolded me and took me in a car to a deserted place far from the noise of the town. For four days and four nights they tortured me using electricity. A week later I was freed.
"I chose to be an officer in order to bring about an effective revolution"
I realized how ineffective my struggle was. 400 of my friends had paid with their lives in their opposition to the feudal regime. I decided to enter the army and to become an officer. As a leader of a division of soldiers I would be more dangerous and more useful than simply campaigning with empty-handed students. The normal pathway to a military career of an officer goes through the Royal Military Academy in Meknès. I enrolled there In the autumn of 1965, and a few days later Ben Barka was arrested in central Paris. The disappearance of Morocco's leading freedom fighter confirmed me in my destiny: to enter the system in order to destroy it.
At the Military Academy, I discovered that I required the agreement of the Ministry of national education in order to undertake a military career. Permission was refused and for a year I continued working at my school with great Impatience. At the end of the academic year, I tried once more to be granted entry to the officers school. I went to see Ahrdan, the minister for National Defence, but with no success.
And so I went to the Royal Palace where I asked for an Interview with the director of the royal military staff. I succeeded in convincing him of my serious vocational intentions regarding a military career. Six years later the general who granted me entry to the Military Academy organized, along with colonel Ababou, the Skhirat attempt. When he saw me at the Royal Palace, had the general guessed that I was a revolutionary? I often asked myself this question after Skhirat where I arrived at the front of my tank brigade a few minutes after his death.
For two years I had been the model training officer which allowed me to be elected president of the magazine of the Royal Academy. In 1968, I was an officer cadet. During my time in Meknès my only fault had been to refuse along with all of my friends to undertake a night march. As a punishment for this act of rebellion we were transferred to Ahermoumou to the school of non-commissioned officers~ called the Cadets of the royal army. Lieutenant colonel Ababou was in charge of the school. For a second time destiny brought me into contact with one of the men who was going to distinguish himself In the struggle against the monarchy. Unfortunately, neither colonel Ababou nor general Madbouh informed me of the Skhlrat plot.
My first meeting with Oufkir
On 10 July 1971, the two above-mentioned officers leading the cadets of the Ahermoumou school besieged Skhirat. Miraculously the King and Oufkir escaped death. General Madbouh was killed. Colonel Ababou was executed the next day. A bloody purge decimated the army.
On this day, the 10 July, I was in my officers' room at the Moulay Ismail camp in Rabat. As commander of an armoured tank division engaged in the protection of the Royal Palace I was awaiting the opportunity which would soon perhaps be given to me to take part in overthrowing the monarchy. I was engrossed In my reading of "How to bring about a coup d'Etat" when the supervising officer, captain Mazour, arrived half-crazed, and informed me that a state of alert had been announced. I quickly put on my uniform, gathered my men together and ordered them to get into their EBR tanks. It was 3 p m. I had the metal door of the ammunitions depot broken down in order to equip the 17 tanks which formed my unit.
Just when leaving the camp I caught sight of lieutenant colonel Saâad, chief of staff of the armoured tank division. He was accompanied by Abaroudi, commander of the Royal Marines. Their clothes were torn and spattered with blood stains. In their state of panic they shouted to me: "The Royal Palace has been attacked by civilians armed with rocket guns and mortars. There are many casualities. Advance towards the Palace! Go by the main road and shoot at anyone who Is armed!"
Leading my line of tanks with my turret door open I left the camp. I was glad at the thought that civilians had dared to attack the sanctuary of the despot but was ashamed at having remained inactive while my country's fate was perhaps being decided.
Having fully decided not to obey orders and to lend a powerful hand to the rebels I decided to progress towards the Palace by the coastal road. By taking this unfortunate decision I in fact saved the king. While my line of tanks was progressing along the coastal road the trucks filled with lieutenant colonel Ababou's cadets were coming back from Skhirat by the main road. If I had taken that route, I would have met up with the rebel soldiers and with the support of my 17 tanks the failed attempt at Skhlrat could easily have been transformed into a victory.
During that summer afternoon the approaches to the coastal road were filled with people looking and walking who came in front of my tanks. Did they already know that a tragedy had ended at the Royal Palace?
I reached Skhirat by a small bridge at the end of which five policemen were diverting the traffic. Churning up the green lawns of the golf course, my line of tanks came to rest in front of the Palace. I gave the order to stop and I lumped to the ground. I made my way to the main entrance where there was a group of excited men. Amongst them I noticed the king accompanied by Oufklr and the generals Bachir and Driss Ben Omar. The arrival of 17 tanks had clearly not been expected. The ambulances. the wounded and the dead, and the panic which prevailed did not take away my calm. I went up to this group. "Where have you come from, lieutenant?", Hassan II asked me. "From Moulay Ismail camp", I said. I added:
"Where is general Gharbaoul ?", curious to know what had become of the commander of the tank division.
"He has been wounded", Oufkir replied. Oufkir asked me for a cigarette (but in vain, because I have never smoked) and then asked what was happening in Rabat.
I told him I did not know and asked him what had happened at the Palace. I learned from Oufkir that lieutenant colonel Ababou, my former boss, and general Madbouh (to whom I owed the fact that I had become an officer), had attacked the Palace leading the cadets, my former friends. I pointed out to Oufkir that Ileutenent colonel Ababou was considered the best officer In the royal forces. I was completely astounded. Oufklr, clearly troubled, did not reply. The king then asked me to put myself at Oufkir's disposal. Oufklr got into my tank In order to get back to Rabat. In the turret of my EBR tank I was standing next to the King's right-hand man, the man whom I detested most In the world after Hassan II. A few days later, he would ask me to be his aide-decamp and soon he would make me his accomplice in overthrowing the king.
Having arrived at Moulay Ismall camp, Oufkir congratulated me on my cool-headedness and asked me to telephone him because he wanted to see me again. Next he went to the post of the commander (PC) of the tank division and called the commanders of the divisions. Ababou had had it announced on radio that the king was dead and that the republic had been proclaimed. But he was already a lone man in his defeat.
A common grave for the rebel officers
The reprisals levelled against the rebels were of a savagery hitherto unknown. Wounded cadets were buried alive In a common grave. At the Moulay Ismall camp Hassan II gave the order for the destruction of the army headquarters which were occupied by Ababou's rebels. I believe that Oufklr dissuaded him from this.
I subsequently learned that Oufklr had but a passive role In the hunting of the rebels. On the other hand Dlimi, the chief of the police, displayed cruelty and ruthlessness. He had two trucks of Instruments of torture brought to the military camp. The king himself took part in scenes of the utmost cruelty. Colonel Chebuati, who was tied to a chair. blindfolded, with feet and hands tied, was several times struck by Hassan.
- Who Is this coward who strikes me while I am tied?, he asked.
- Take off the blindfold, Hassan ordered Dlimi.
Chebuati spat in the king's face before many blows rained down on him.
- Tomorrow your dead body will be spat on, promised Hassan
On 13 July, the shooting range at Temara was transformed into a slaughter-house. Tied to poles, 13 offIcers were executed by 13 firing squads each comprising of 1 3 soldiers. The king was present at this massacre accompanied by King Hussein of Jordan. Laraki, the Prime Minister, was the first one to spit on the dead bodies. Commander Salmi cut off the hand of one of the executed officers with a knife in order to recover a pair of handcuffs. A bulldozer ran over the bodies crushing them into a common grave.
Terror reigned in Morocco. It was rare that any officer or non-commissioned officers had not lost one or several friends during this repression. My friends at the camp and I hardly dared to speak. Everyone was suspicious of everyone else.
The next week the commanding officer of the brigade informed me that I was expected by Oufkir at his residence in Souissi. Feeling only half-sure I made my way towards the villa of the one I considered to be the assassin of Ben Barka.
Dressed in civilian clothes, his eyes hidden behind dark glasses which he never took off, Oufkir treated me in a friendly way. He congratulated me on the self-control amd coolness I had shown during the day of the 10 July and he asked me questions about my childhood and my military career. He introduced me to his children and to his little lion cub, called SkhIrat.
He questioned me closely regarding the state of mInd amongst my fellow-officers and in order to save time I offered to give him a detailed report on the subject in three days.
Oufkir used all his charm in order to Inveigle the young officers coming from the rank I did. Morocco is entering a period of difficulty, he assured me. If the king does not u"nlertake serious reforims I feel the army will prepure more revolts.
In spite of the bad reputation of my host I was gradually losing my distrust of him. "A number of generals and ministers are corrupted, he assured me. The king is SIETOWded by CorriiF~ tion and It is also to be found amongst the army staff." I then mentioned to him the name of a colonel who was well known for stealing money from the army's finance and supplies department. "He Is a thug to be eliminated", added Oufkir.
I left the general and his sumptuous villa more than ever resolved to align myself with the devil If this was necessary in order to overthrow the potentate whose hands were red with blood. The revolt at Skhirat had transformed Oufkir but of this I was as yet Ignorant.
Four days later I entered for the second time the residence of my new ally carrying a 30 page Inflammatory report. In this report I denounced the corruption amongst the officers and the promotion due to favouritism and bribery. After having read it carefully Oufkir locked the report in the safe hidden in the living-room wall.
Oufkir describes to me Hassan's despotism
After dinner, the general told me several stories about the court which illustrated the servitude of the ministers and the despotism of Hassan. My host smoked one cigarette after another while launching into a violent tirade against the regime. He told me that at a recent meeting of the council of ministers Snoussi, the black-skinned minister, replied to a remark made by the king: "I am yoor slave". In a rage Hassan declared: "it's not enough to say It, you m'ust be it: this is how my dvflusty has always considered Its servants."
During the dessert the second man in the kingdom asked me to be his aide-de-camp and the teacher of one of his sons. I accepted on condition that I could retain command of my tank division. This was granted me. From that moment onwards I lived at the general's villa and I became his confidant. Ministers and generals were in turn present at the table of the one whom the world called "the General". The dreaded DIlmi became director of Security and never came to the General1s house. I believed, however, that they were friends.
Oufkir made a habit of telling me important secrets when I accompanied him in his car. In the month of September at 3 o'clock in the morning the general was recalling details of the Skhirat plot:
- 1,000 trainee non-commissioned officers could have changed the history of Morocco and made the country advance by a century. They have shown us the way. We must get rid of the monarchy. Hassan has retained all the traditions of a dynasty which had led Morocco to disaster from the beginning of the 20th century. At this very moment instead of being busy with the affairs of the kingdom, he is at Fès with his prostitutes. He has a harem of 150 women, some of whom were kidnapped by the King's private mafia. Our king is a drug addict. His Palace has become a centre for hashish. His son, who is 7 years old, is chairman of the meetings and men kiss his hand; it's worse than under the reign of Louis XIV.
The general who spoke rather bad Arabic expressed himself in French which was not understood by the body guard who accompanied us.
I, as a simple lieutenant, was quite overcome at hearing these secrets. Not concealing my emotion, I stuttered: "You have done me a great honour in telling me these secrets. I will never let you down. I am ready to execute the king." -"No I myself shall take responsibility for that because I will leave to no one else the honor of executing the tyrant of my country."
From that moment onwards a pact was established between myself and the man who had led the repression against my political friends, and I have never before said to anybody the secrets told to me that night.
I had a room in Oufkir's villa where I slept and each morning I would go to the Moulay Ismail camp where I had retained command of my tank brigade. My powerful ally could be very talkative or very silent. He spoke to me at length about Nasser and his national charter which he knew about in great detail. He wanted the American bases removed from Morocco: "the largest of which is the Royal Palace Itself", he would say.
Only once did he speak to me about the Ben Barka affair:
"I had nothing to do with his disappearance. Hassan is the only one responsible for the assassination of Ben Barka."
I was not convinced about Oufkir's innocence in the Ben Barka affair but I had to be realistic. Perhaps I had formed an alliance with the devil, but when my country would be liberated from the monarchy, then there would always be time, I thought, to separate from Oufkir and to oppose him if necessary.
"Hassan became suspicious of his "protector"
The preparations for our first attack began three months after Skhirat. The general explained his plan to me during a car journey. His plan seemed simple and effective to me.
- Hassan comes to the staff headquarters almost every Thursday to chair the meetings of the commanding officers. In the conference room there is a safe in the wall. I will lock a machine-gun in the safe. After Hassan arrives, I will need only to take hold of this gun and fire at him.
He drew a plan of the room for me showing the position of the safe and indicating by crosses the seats occupied by the commanding officers and the chief clerks of the headquarters. - After executing Hassan I would tell the officers that I have acted in the name of the people. Then I would play a tape recording of a communiqu4 which you have recorded. Next I would telephone to Driss, the minister of the PTT (national post office company), to ask him to place himself at my disposal. He will accept this gladly' I would telephone to Moulay Abdallah and under any kind of pretext I will have him brought to the headquarters where I will have him arrested. Finally I would call together all the division commanders. You will wait for me in the office adjacent to the conference room. I will send for you and you would go to the radio station with the prerecorded tapes.
Using a tape recorder bought in a shop in Rabat I recorded in Arabic a declaration which I had had read to the general who approved it after making some changes. He asked me to emphasize the word Revolution, the army serving the people
Here is a summary of it:
The Islamic Republic of Morocco.
"Liberty - political and economic democracy - Islamic unity."
"In the name of Allah, in the name of our martyrs, in the name of the people, in the name of justice and right, and in the name of the will of the people to choose the regime which suits them and to determine their own destiny, we proclaim an Islamic republic, the abolition of the monarchy which the Koran forbids. We announce that the tyrant, the dictator, the madman Hassan II has been condemned to death and executed by the the provisional council of the commander of the revolutIon for all his crimes and murders against our people. A temporary revolutionary council is temporarily going to direct the affairs of the country until a revolutionary concil has been elected by a general election."
"The king has been liquidated by the army in order to give power to the general will of the people. We who Initiated the revolution have no magic wand for bringing about the general desire of the people. We have eliminated the king. It Is now up to the people to put an end to the domination and exploitation perpetrated by the other little kings who are to be found throughout the country. We have acted in the capacity of citizens and not In the capucity of soldiers. Henceforth, we will direct our bayonets not to wards the people but against tyranny."
Everything was ready for the great day. One Wednesday in November Oufkir placed the machine-gun and the tape recorder in the safe in the army headquarters. The next day both of us got into a black DS driven by a chief sergeant. Vie drove Into the courtyard of the army headquarters saluted by the guard of honour. I was worried and anxious and Oufkir's calm greatly Impressed me: He shook hands with me and went into the conference room.
Shut in the adjacent office I waited for perhaps 30 minutes or perhaps an hour. Finally the door opened, the general came up to me and said: "We failed. The King has Just telephoned me to say that he would not be coming."
For seven long days I waited for the following Thursday. Once more the king did not come to the fatal rendez-vous. Oufkir Informed me that in future the conferences would take place at the Royal Palace. "Let's execute him thure then", I suggested to the general. "It's too risky, he replied. We must find some other way".
At the end of the year Oufkir asked the king to visit the barracks which holds the BLS security division. Hassan foiled the scheme and did not come.
On another occasion we were expecting him at the Moulay Ismail barracks. It was the time of the most important Islamic festival (the festival of the sacrifice of the sheep). However, we waited in vain because this was another rendez-vous which the king did not appear at.
We thought we could succeed in March. Hassan was to be present at a conference in the officers' mess. In the conference room, which is also a projection room, Oufkir hid his machine-gun. However, becoming more and more suspicious, the king did not appear at this meeting.
A short while later, Oufkir narrowly escaped a helicopter accident In Agadir. He assured me that "Hassan had the helicopter sabotaged".
Before the meeting of the African summit the king demanded that all divisions be placed on a state of alert, the officers themselves not being allowed to return to their homes. I suggested to Oufklr that we make the attempt on 10 July, the day of Hassan's birthday. One year after the carnage of Skhirat, the celebrations at the Summer Palace were taking place with the usual guests and the scandalous luxury. The general rejected my proposals. Nevertheless, I went to the Palace for the celebra tions. For a second time I found myself face to face with the king and noticed his ravage visage. Dressed as a cow-boy, his majesty, who was babbling with his obsequious guests, asked for a few minutes' silence in memory of the victims of the sedition. The following day Oufkir was present at the reception called "The night of the women". When he returned he told me, sickened, how the king was kissing his courtesans before throwing them a handful of diamonds. The guests rushed forward jostling one another to pick up the precious stones thrown on the ground.
The machin-gunning of the Boeng with blank shots
In August, Hassan left for France. We had to arrange something for his return.
I suggested occupying SaI~ airport using trustworthy men and shooting at the king while he came off the plane. Oufkir informed me that he had decided to attack Hassan's Boeing using F 5 fighter planes. He said to me that he himself would be In one of the planes and would participate in the machine-gunning. After a quick visit to his family, who were on holiday In Tétouan, my accomplice was back in Rabat on 10 August.
The next day he met with lieutenant colonel Amkrane and asked him to machine-gun the Royal Boeing. Hassan's return was scheduled for 16 August. On the evening of the 15th of August Amkrane, who was extremely Ill, informed us that he would not be able to pilot the plane and suggested Kouira as a substitute pilot, a man of his confidence.
- You're the boss, he said to Oufkir, you can inform him.
A meeting was arranged by telephone In Casablanca, in a bar in Hassan II avenue. At 3.30 a m, the general returned. He woke me up to tell me: "EverythIng is ready, we are In the hands of God". He wanted to hear one last time the recording which I had prepared before our first attempt.
That night he did not go to bed. On the morning of 16 August, he went to Temara for a mysterious meeting and came back about 11 o'clock. "Three F 5 fighters will attack the king's plane - soon as it flies over Moroccan soil. This time he will not escape", he assured me.
At 4 p m the general telephoned colonel Hatimi, commander of the tank brigade, and asked him to go to the airport. A little while later I left him and went back to Moulay Ismall camp.
"Wait for me there, and I will contact you."
At 4.30 p m, Oufkir ordered the tank brigade to go on a state of alert. At 5 p m, my 17 tanks were armed. A few moments later the general came into the barracks' yard, in a 403, driven by a commander of the marines. Thirty minutes earlier he had heard in the control tower a message transmitted by the Boeing's radio "stop firing, the King has been fatally wounded".
At the commanding officers' post he was talking with three officers of the tank brigade when someone called him on the telephone "on behalf of the king". I will never know what the king said to him because I was never again to see him alive. He left the camp in an R 16 driven by a captain. I learned that he had subsequently gone to the army headquarters and to the airport where the king had disappeared.
Responsibility for the failure of the operation lay with commander Kouira who had equipped the machine-guns in three fighter lets with blank training bullets instead of using explosive bullets. He had mistaken the ammunition boxes. As a further piece of bad luck Kouira's machine-gun had failed to work correctly. He attempted to make his fighter jet collide with the Boeing and escape by parachute. The two other pilots, lieutenant Zyad and lieutenant Boükhalif, had used up all their ammunition supplies. They touched down at Kenitra, loaded their machine-guns and went on to Salé airport which they machine-gunned. Commander Kouira landed by parachute at Oulad-Khallfa, near Kenitra, where police arrived in a helicopter and captured him.
A suicide victim riddled with bullets
Without receiving any news I remained with my tanks at the tank camp where I waited for a part of the night. At 3 o'clock in the morning, a foreign radio announced that Oufkir had left from the air-base in Kenitra. At 5 a m, France-Inter announced: "General Oufklr has committed suicide". In spite of this fearful piece of news I did not despair, suspecting that in these moments of madness false pieces of news were quite common. He had told me that if anything should happen to him, I was to put the recordings in a safe place, the recordings which announced the fall of the monarchy.
At daybreak, around 6 a m, I left the camp by the Infirmary exit and in my car, which had been parked in a neighbouring street, I made my way towards the general's residence. I stopped my car behind the villa and with my revolver hidden In my jacket N approached a soldier in combat uniform who was standing on guard.
- Has the general come back?
- Which general?
- Oufkir.
- He is dead. Go in, you can see him.
Oüfkir's brother led me to the body of my chief which was covered with a blanket. I lifted the blanket and looked carefully at the body riddled with bullets. The chest, the stomach, and a portion of the face had been blown off. The bullets had been shot from behind. So he had not committed suicide.
The brief-case, which was so incriminating for me, could not be found. I had to flee. I abandoned my car in the centre of the town after exchanging my officers' uniform for beach wear I had found on the back seat. I got rid of my automatic 11 mm pistol which Oufkir had given me. At each cross-roads armed soldiers were checking the occupants of cars. Behind the station I got into an old taxi which took me to Yaakoub El Mansour, Rabat's shanty town. I walked towards the sea and took off my clothes keeping on only a pair of bathing trunks and made my way southwards, towards Casablanca. Before arriving at Skhirat I decided to move Inland and to make a long detour. At Fedalah, I bought a djellabah (typical Moroccan style of dress) and a wig. N arrived in Casablanca at night where I learnt from a friend that the police were searching for me.
My escape to Sweden
ror two and a half months I wandered all over, sleeping anywhere. After living for a month in a hippie camp near Mogador, I made my way into the Middle Atlas Mountains, where I lived in a nomad camp amongst the sheep and the goats. For eight months 1 looked after the flocks and completely lost contact with the world. In March, a mokhazin (the police in the country- side) post, forces of the Ministry of Interior were attacked by some peasants not far from my nomad's camp. The army, using helicopters, was combing the region. I had to flee.
After a great many precautions, I arrived in Sweden in August 1973. One of the few documents which I managed to retain was waiting for me poste restante in Stockholm. It was signed by the commander of the Military Royal Academy and it stated:
"Officer cadet Rami is a graduate teacher of the Ecole Normale Superieure and was a teacher of Arabic at the Mohamed V senior secondary school. Because of his loyalty to his country he gave up his position as a lecturer in the lecture theatres for the post of leading men on the battlefield. He is a trainee officer possessing the quality of absolute sacrifice and a keenly developed sense of orgnization; furthermore, by his sense of honour and service, officer cadet Rami has done much for the Ecole. Honest, reliable and trustworthy and enjoying the sense of danger and filled with unquestionable physical and moral courage, officer cadet Rami possesses all the qualities which have always made great officers."
AHMED RAMI SPEAKS about
The moroccan revolution
(AUGUST 16.1972)
(Published In the magazine "Afrique-Asie", December 1975)
Q: What role did Oufkir play in the attempt of 1972?
A: To summarize, one might say that he was going to take on the role of Naguib and Spinola. But it was the young officers who planned and carried out the operation of August 16. They benefitted from Oufkir's complicity. But he - and these are his own words - "only wanted to take on the role of Naguib". He was aware of his reputation. his limits and of the exact role he was able to take on.
Q: Did he play any part whatsoever In the Skhirat affair of 1971
A: He was aware that plans were afoot. And he agreed to them. However, he was not aware of the details concerning the place and time of the coup d'Etat. He, like everyone else, was surprised by the events of Skhirat. So discrete had the officers planning the event been, that only a handful of officers knew about it.
Q: And the assassination of Ben Barka?
A: During the course of events in 1965, I myself held a teaching post in Casablanca and was a member of the UNFP. I was arrested and tortured three times: 1962, 1964 and on March 23, 1965. Consequently when myself and other young men became officers we spoke at great length of the Ben Barka affair with Oufkir, when the opportunity arose. The question as to who killed Ben Barka, was for us not the most important one. But is was the symbol of Ben Barka which was of interest to us. This had been a political assassination. Ben Barka was a political mixture of Lenin and Edgar Faure (i.e. left or right), and like Oufkir, fell victim to the regime and to the king whom he himself had helped set up In Morocco. A tyrant, like a scorpion, acts by Instinct and does not make a distinction between "friends" and enemies. The abduction and assassination of Ben Barka was not Hassan II's first criminal deed; nor was it his last. Dozens upon hundreds of militants were, like Ben Barka, physically eliminated. Since the Ben Barka affair took place in France, and because it had also became a matter for the French police, this political and criminal assassination assumed International dimensions. This affair ought therefore to be placed within the general political framework of Morocco, i.e. the savage terrorism of Hassan II against the people of Morocco.
It is within this framework which we spoke to Oufkir about It. Here is what he said:
"The king has created a special police force (SSS) which answers directly to him and which has the task of supervising the army and Oufkir and Dlimi himself. This system was devised by three experts from the CIA. Neither Oufkir, who was Minister for Domestic Affairs, nor anyone else knew the whole system. It was based on the do~le model of the Mafia and of the CIA. The king had given the order (recorded by Oufkir) that he wanted Ben Barka 'dead or alive'." Oufkir told me this and I am revealing for the first time that when Hassan II learned that Ben Barka had been killed by the crooks, he asked for Ben Barka's head or his entire corpse. Oufkir also told me that "Ben Barka is hurled under the Palace Wall: between the Palace and the Faculty of Law". Ben Barka's body was therefore taken back to Morocco on the command of Hassan II to be buried in the tradition of the Alaouite kings who thus behaved towards all their enemies.
Oufkir made us compile a dossier to institute genuine legal proceedings concerning the Ben Barka affair after the success of the coup d'Etat in August 1972. He himself stated that he was ready to take his share of the responsibility. He was, as it happened, well-informed. However, he told us that he had warned Ben Barka. He stated that when Ben Barka was in Morocco, he had warned him of Hassan Ii's plans of having him killed and advised him to leave the country.
Before meDOufkir swore that he had not killed Ben Barka. He said that Ben Barka was his natural ally. Oufkir's wife, who is still alive, can testify to this. Ben Barka was their personal friend. Once, during the Resistance against colonialism, Oufkir's wife had hidden Ben Barka and had helped him to escape by hiding him in the boot of her car, while he was being looked for by the French police. I must make things quite clear. I am not out to exonerate Oufkir. I am simply repeating what Oufklr told me.
It is my opinion that this affair should not be turned Into some sort of shady affair. It Is a political assassination. Hassan II had sentenced Ben Barka to death. And he executed him. In reality Hassan II himself was only carrying out orders. According to Oufkir, the date of Ben Barka's abduction had been moved forward under pressure from the CIA and the Israeli Mossad because Ben Barka, in his role as secretary general, was preparing the conference in Havana of the three continents by initiative of Nasser.
In Morocco, Hassan II was objectively only the ClA's agent, an agent of the USA. It is in this role that he assassinated Ben Barka. Those really responsible for the assassination of Ben Barka are the CIA, the israeli Mossad, and the USA. Hassan II was simply their agent in this affair. Before Independence, the Moroccan monarchy was not a hereditary one (from father to son). The 1'Ouléma" (religious scholars) chose the sultan. It was Ben Barka who, at the beginning of the independence, in his role as president of the "Council of Advisers"1 officially asked Mohamed V to designate Hassan as "crown prince"! Ben Barka was Hassan's mathematics teacher. The post of "crown prince" had not existed before the official suggestion of Ben Barka! Mohamed V was the "Trolan Horse" of French colonialism and Hassan is the "Trojan Horse" of neo-colonialist American-Zionism! Son of the traitor GIaoul who offered Hassan's mother, pregnant, to Mohamed V. Hassan, like Kabousse, consequently seized power by a commonplace coup d'Etat by assassinating his own father during a minor surgical operation on 26 February 1961.
Q: What could have brought Oufkir and Hassan II into conflict?
A: The same thing that brought the officers and Hassan into conflict: symbol of corruption and decadence. Oufkir was perhaps the only officer of his rank and generation who was not corrupted. He left nothing behind in personal fortune. The corruption scandalized and revolted him. The mentality of a king who treated Morocco as his own personal property and the exploitation of the people all revolted him. Officers of his generation had had a French training and Oufkir himself believed that this had given him a certain amount of officer's dignity. For example, kissing the hand of the Chief of State was, to his eyes, both incompatible and humiliating. Hassan ii treated his officers like slaves. In general, the officers of the army were indignant and scandalized by the fact that Hassan used the army as a strike force against the people and as a watch-dog of the monarchy.
The corps of Moslem officers, in general, can not be used indefinitely to maintain the status quo. The soldiers of the Islamic world have come from the people and stay by them.
Q: Had the coup d'Etat succeeded, what sort of regime would you have instituted?
A: We wanted to institute Liberty as method and not as content. The rules of the democratic "game" and not the "game" itself. It was not up to us young officers to make decisions, but for the whole of the people of Morocco in a democratic regime. A propos the political content and the orientation cf the regime, Oufkir left us young officers to take the initiative. We had prepared a plan, a political charter and a provisional programme. Oufkir's aim was above all to ally himself with us to eliminate the monarchy as the first necessary step. Afterwards it would be up to the people to decide the kind of regime they wanted. We, the young officers, had a programme but it was a programme among others, meant as a suggestion to the people as opposed to an imposition. The summary of our intentions was published by the Western press. In the proclamation, which was going to be broadcast on August 16 1972 (see "Paris Match", 29.9 1973), we spoke of the Islamic Republic of Morocco. Our aims were liberty, democracy and unity: unity both national and Arab ("In the name of Allah, in the name of the people, etc ...), liberty of the citizen, democracy, social justice, ownership of every means of production by the people through democratic and decentralized self-government and respect for non-exploitative private property. Social democracy and Arab unity. We do not conceive a Morocco isolated from the Islamic and Arab nation. We do not recognize artificial borders created by imperialism and colonialism. Borders created to divide the Moslems and Arabs and to rule them. Islamic and Arab unity is no romantic dream but a vital necessity. A question of life or death for the Islamic and Arab nation and for all Moslems and Arabs. Economically1 politically and militarily it is only an Islamic and Arab unity which can take us out of the present serious deadlock which lead to the division. Towards and in Islamic and Arab unity there are problems but these problems can and must be overcome. However, the problems of the present catastrophic division will only lead to death as an Islamic nation and an Arab independency. The existence and strength of the Jewish usurper and bandit state Israel is only built on our schism and weakness.
Q: So the main objective was to eliminate the monarchy?
A: Yes. The monarchy Is a personal power. The king is "boss". In Morocco the monarchy Is not, strictly speaking, a national "institution" but rather a Mafia. Only one man is in charge. Everything comes from him. He "manages" Morocco as his private property and the Moroccans as slaves and between the king and the people are a band of bandits and bastards. One can not move forward a single step today in Morocco without the fall of the king. One can therefore not go forward, realize objectives in development and in democracy, without abolishing the monarchy, without abolishing the regime of Hassan II, and without proclaiming an Islamic republic1 a democratic state. Hassan II symbolizes and personalizes corruption and moral, political and economical decadence. "He Is the state" In Morocco and it is by his physical elimination that a change is possible. All attempts at camouflaging and reshuffling of his rotten regime have failed. The politicians in true "Edgar Faure" style, i.e. the opportunists, have made us lose a great deal of time and made the people feel contempt for the "politicians".
Q: It was your intention to proclaim an Islamic republic. You are aware that western "specialists" on Morocco have often mentioned Berber attempts to seize power.
A: First of a11, for us, an Islamic or Arab republic does not mean an ethnic or racial republic. To our eyes it was a definition of the political content of the regime we had in mind. For example, it Is a totally superflous fact to know whether Nasser, who himself is a symbol of Arabism, was, racially or ethnically speaking, an Arab or not. He is a Moslem.For us Arabism refers to a nation united by history, culture and also by the religion of Islam. Today It is also an Islamic nation which struggles and which the Islamic revolution unites. In Morocco, the man in the street does not understand that it is possible to distinguish between Moslem and Arab. For him, every Moslem is an Arab and every Arab, a Moslem. At the level of the people it is impossible to have this "division" or this "antagonism" of which the imperialistic "specialists" and French or American colonialists speak and which they themselves created. In the Arab World Islam is the soul of Arabism, the Islamic culture is the Arab culture. For us, Arabism is Islam and every Moroccan Is a Moslem and all our citizens are Moroccans; equal and united. The Koran Is our true constitution and its language our national language. Our problems are political ones!
Q: The "specialists", however, presented Oufkir as a Berber nationalist.
A: The word "Berber" is of European origin. Those you call "Berber" call themselves "imazighn" or "chlouh" and not "Berber". "Amazigh" means "free" while "Berber" comes from "Barbare", a qualifier the Romans used to refer to the inhabitants of their colonies and their non Roman slaves.
Myself, I am "amazigh" and "chalh", born at Tafraoute, a Soussi from the Tahala tribe in the Souss Mountains; but I do not regard myself as a "Berber"! Every Arab, every Moslem is "lmazighn", that is to say a free man born free. All moroccans are "imazighn". ("Amazigh" is the opposite of "Ahrdan" which means slave. Mahjoubi Ahrdan is a slave of the king and not an "amazigh"!) Oufklr was a Moroccan! A Moslem that Is to say an amazigh Arab!
The division of Moroccans into "Berbers" and "Arabs" is an old colonialist dream which has undergone a total failure since the infamous fiasco of the "Dahir Berber" attempt. Our problems are not ethnical ones!
Q: But Ouftir was the kingdom's no. citizen. Why was it that he did not try to show his opposition for the king at an earlier stage?
A: From the outset of independence all the political parties and political élites of the country paid allegiance to the king and gave absolute power to the monarchy. Oufkir was a soldier and not a politician!
Oufkir never had the means of overthrowing the king. There you have another legend which must be destroyed: since Independence Oufkir had never been in the army. And the army Is the only strength which could overthrow the king. Not one political party called the monarchy into question. Oufklr was at the Palace and the Ministry of the Interior. However, in this position as Minister of the Interior, he did have one corps under his command: the humble "Auxiliary Forces". He confided to us that he had prepared a plan to overthrow the king by using the Auxiliary Forces, together with Colonel Chebuati. We ourselves asked Oufklr your same question. From the outset we did not want to involve ourselves with him at any price.
Oufkir also said that he had never politically supported the regime of Hassan II, contrary to the politicians who continue to do so. He worked for the State as a soldier, while at Independence, all the political officers, all the leaders entered the services of Mohamed V. It was them who chose him as Chief of State. It was even Ben Barka in his position of president of the Council of Advisers who proposed Hassan as "crown prince". Oufkir suffered from the reputation which the people had of him. He was hoping for the chance to show his true face. And It was for this reason that he allied with us young officers when he could have allied himself with the generals and other corrupt high-ranking officers. The army Is but the mirror of Moroccan society. When, in 1971, the king handed over charge of the army to Oufkir, he instinctively drew closer to those elements of the army exhibiting revolutionary tendencies, and he also opposed the corrupt elements as well as the "monarchists". (ln the army there are no monarchists by conviction, but only through interest.) Oufkir enjoyed the same bad reputation from the young officers as he did from the people. The army is not a separate body of Moroccan society. When, in July 1971, the radio announced that the king had given charge of the army to Oufkir, the young officers received the news angrily and obiectionably. However, very soon, Oufkir achieved an immense popularity in the heart of the army. We, therefore, discovered that we had misjudged him. We learned that many of the things previously attributed to him were simply made up.
Q: Sometimes it has been said that Oufkir was the mun of the foreign powers; France, the United States and even israel. What was he?
A: In Morocco, Hassan II is the first agent of imperialism.
So instead of criticizing Hassan II, who is the head, those
involved are critized: Oufkir, Dlimi, Benhima and Gdira.
When Gdira was Minister of the Interior, the press only critized him. But the people were not deceived by this; in the streets it was said: Gdra, not Gdira, is to be critized. If Oufkir had the importance the legends attributed him with, if it was he who marked out the politics, the regime would, of course, have changed after his disappearance. What does one see today? If there has been any change whatsoever, the regime is worse than it was. The Royal Palace is Morocco's largest American base. We are governed by a traitor and a drugged villain. Should this villain fall, his entire regime would fall.
Q: Yes, but even so, when he was under sentence of death In France, the French Government did allow Oufklr to come to Lyons to receive treatment for his eyes.
A: France knows that Hassan II is the "master" of Morocco. It was the French and the Americans who put him there. Hassan II is no marionette, it is the others, his "ministers" and his slaves who are the marionettes. Yes, he is a marionette of the French, the Americans and the Zionists but not of his collaborateurs. De Gaulle himself had said that the man responsible for the abduction of Ben Barka was Hassan II. Hassan is the agent of the Americans.
Q: When Oufkir was in power one often spoke of relations between the Israeli and Moroccan secret services.
A: Firstly, the Moroccan monarchy (like all Arab monarchies) and Israel have the same enemies: the Islamic revolution.
Every victory of the Islamic revolution is a threat both against Israel and the Arab monarchies. Hussein of Jordan and Hassan of Morocco are the objective allies of Israel. These allies share common relations and interests. Israel, for example, sold 100 tanks (AMX 13 tonnes) to Morocco after the 1967 war. This story caused enormous scandal in the army. In the tanks the soldiers found Israeli coins and newspapers. Sometimes the insignia of the Israeli army could be seen through the peeling paintwork. Furthermore, the tanks were in bad condition. French officers from the armoured division (60 technicians) came to repair these tanks. Only 60 of the tanks could be repaired. The repairs, when it came down to it, cost more than If Morocco were to have purchased new tanks. Oufkir was not In the army at that time. Moreover, he himself told me that Mohamed V, this "Trojan Horse" of imperialism and colonialism, had, upon Independence, appointed Dr Benzakin, a notorious Zionist, as minister of postal and telecommunication systems, to allow the transfer from Morocco towards Israel of Moroccan Jews who were encouraged to emigrate to Israel. We of the capital. in the Souss Mountains, have always called the sultan nAglid yiromein", that is to say "the king of the colonialists". Hassan II is the king of the lews and the Americans.
Q: So after the disappearance of Oufkir, Hassan II was able to completely reestablish the situation?
A: The two coups d'Etat weakened the regime but the repression and the dictatorship were only increased. Fascism " à la Hassan II" and the Moroccan feudal system still survive. But Hassan II realizes that Time is not on his side; he knows that he is unable to stop the direction of History. He is doing what he can to play for time. We have a proverb: when a fire is just about to go out, it makes a lot of smoke. At this moment Hassan II is making a lot of noise, he is leaving a lot of smoke
Q: Was the attempted planting of a guerilla in Morocco in March, 1973, a serious one?
A: The people's struggle has never stopped. All armed attempts figure in the framework of the Moroccan revolution. The attempt of 3 March 1973 is an episode of this revolutIon which is still going on. It was a deed of courage which had been prepared at length. Every revolutIon has had its temporary and brief failures. We learn a lot from our failures.
Q: Is there a revolutionary situation In Morocco?
A: Objectively, there is a revolutionary situation in Morocco. The regime Is anachronistic: feudalism in the middle of the 20th century. Were it to disappear tomorrow, no one would be surprised. The regime Is historically condemned. Hassan II is very well aware of this. It Is a matter of a few more years at the most. We have, in Morocco, all the objective conditions of a radical and Islamic revolution. If we are still neo-colonized, it is because we are still neo-colonisable.
Q: Where could the next alert come from?
A: Hassan II forbids any opposition or political party which does not recognize the present monarchial regime. This means that only monarchist political parties are tolerated. Any criticism of the king or of his politics is forbidden while it is the king who is responsible for the regime and the politics of the governing party.
So where could the next alert come from? Not from any of the present parties. The parties have condemned themselves. They are playing the regime "game". They take part in the regime's camouflage strategy. The divisions between the parties are moreover artificial; they do not reflect the country's real social forces. It is Hassan II who creates and decides the limits: the existence or not of these parties as well as the party leaders and the elimination of those who are not tolerated. It was he who subdued the political, marketing and professional 4lite. Whether they be in the Government or belong to the "opposition", these partisans are simply playing the roles given them by Hassan II. The Shah of Iran had also created an opposition party to his regime: "The opposition of His Majesty". The parties betrayed the Moroccan revolution. They only make deals with the Palace in order to have a share In the power. The only way they enter the Palace is on all fours. The two attempts made by the army and the attempt of 3 March 1973 to overthrow the regime which resulted In the deaths of martyrs, were shamefully exploited by professional politicians to turn the outcomes to their political spoils. After the uprising in Casablanca In 1965, which resulted in thousands of victims, and which was totally spontaneous, Hassan II called upon those men who had played no part in them. They wait until Hassan II offers them ministers and also to become his servants and share his crumbs. They claim to represent the will of the people. In reality, these puppet leaders do not represent their "parties" at the Palace, but rather the Palace in their "parties". Revolutionary struggles sort out the men: opportunists are always discovered in the end. The professional politicians are those who wait for the revolution to create an atmosphere of fear, steal this and use this to take power and "harvest" its fruits! In the army, we, too, have our "Portuguese", that Is to say, revolutionary officers and soldiers. Had these officers "attempted a coup" and succeeded, they would not have kept power themselves but would certainly not have given It to the political parties at that time. If we were to start up a revolution this would in no way benefit those men who are members of Hassan's regime. The present parties play an Integral part In the regime and it is our intention to overthrow the whole regime. It is Hassan who Imposes on the "legal" parties, men who have the "ability" to lead them, men who must be ousted, what they may write in their "newspapers" what they can or what they can't say etc ... It is the duty of the revolutionaires to condemn these men who have betrayed and who participate objectively in Hassan li's masquerade. The only way to put an end to the exploitation is to Institute a political, social and economic democracy, called "shora" in Islam. For this, Hassan II must be eliminated politically because he will not eliminate himself. Only a revolution can abolish this regime. We must organize a united front to carry on the Islarnic struggle. There Is but one armed struggle which could wipe out the regime. Experience from Hassan Ii's regime must convince us all that only by an act of armed and political resistance will his dictatorship be overthrown. Only the re-institution of revolutionary and pure Islam can save our country from the abyss and death.
Abdelkrim Al Khattabi, in the darkest night of colonialism, fought in the name of Islam, weapons In hand, In the Rif, against two armies; the French and the Spanish. This is the only man never to have betraved. He lived and died with honour. The example of Abdelkrlrn must guide us. This is the lesson which we must take after 30 years of the present regime.
Those who do not wish to understand must be left behind and the fight continued despite them. Our sadness is due to the fact that many of our political leaders who knew how to begin their career in politics (for independence) with honour, did not know how to terminate them with honour. Arab leaders are not acquainted with an honourable "retirement"!
The army alone should not be expected to provide the revolutionary fight. The entire people ought to provide it. What is the army anyway? It Is an integral part of Moroccan society. It is the unemployed who become soldiers. It is secondary school pupils, out of work students, who experience the same misery as the people, who became officers. They are fully aware of all the problems facing the people. There exists no antagonism between the people and the Moroccan army. In Morocco, our army is not of the Latin American or European type. Our army is a young one without traditions or military caste. Servicemen and civilians organized in an avant-garde party can carry out a true revolution, not a revolutIon of centurions but a popular revolution. The example of the Nasserlan revolution shows us that Arab and Islamic officers and soldiers can only be natural allies of every popular revolution and without some action against the despot Hassan II by the Moroccan army, the deadly immobilism pervading in Morocco could last for many years to come.
And when I speak of Islam, I mean the enlightened and tolerant Islam.
Q: What state Is the army in after Skhirat?
A: The officers are, at present, all young. The old guard was done away with in various ways. Therefore the officers have the same state of mind as the rest of the youth in Morocco. It is of course understood that within the body of officers, all the divisions of society exist. The coups of 1971 and 1972 have proved this. Besides, these young officers bear daily witness to the exploitation of the people and the rottenness of the regime. They see every scandal. Their anger is aroused by the fact that they realize that the regime is using them to terrorize the people and to protect the monarchy from the anger of the people. Their dignity is held up to ridicule because they know that they are acting as guard dogs for the protection of corruption and decadence. Today's army is like a corps of teachers, a corps of engineers and a corps of doctors. But in the army the difference lies in discipline and a keener pragmatic sense more inclined to action than to words. In any case, objectively, the mood prevalent in the army is one of revolution. Hassan has practically lost his grip on the army. For a regime without popular legitimacy and which is founded solely upon police strength and repression, it is the end.
Q: What influence did participation in the war of October 1973 have on the Moroccan army?
A: In 1967 and in 1973, the initiative for participation came from the officers themselves. They spontaneously put themselves down as volunteers. As for king Hassan II, he rather feared contact between the young Moroccan officers and the revolutionary Syrian and Egyptian officers. In 1967, 60 officers threatened to resign If they were not sent to the front. Hassan might have thought that in sending them far away, he would have rid himself of them. But the contact of the ~1oroccan army with the people of Syria again strengthened the revolution- ary and unionist tendencies of the young Moroccan officers who are aware of Hassan's true objectives.
For Moroccans, and, in general all Arabs, the fight against Zionism, imperialism and Arab reaction is one and the same. The fight against Zionism and imperialism and the struggle against Hassan II are complimentary. For the army, the uprisings against Hassan and the participation In the war against Israel are of the same type. Hassan II and Zionism are enemies of the Moroccan people. In 1 967-68, Moroccans In the south rose up against Spanish colonialism. It was Hassan II, at that time head of the army, who, together with the Spanish Army, quashed the uprising.
Q: Are Moroccans more to the Right or to the Left?
A: We are neither the one nor the other, but revolutionary Moslems. In our eyes there Is no Right or Left but progressives and reactionaires.
"Left", "Right" are imported European notions. We have no need to import ideologies from either the East or the West. All we have to do Is to apply the eternal principles of Islam found in the Koran.
The ideology of our people is Islam. We do not want to make a revolution with the people we dream of but with the people we have. If you import an Ideology you must Import a people and a nation, too! We are Moslem Arabs and each of our revolutions must spring from Islam. Evolution means evolving what we are towards what we want to be and not "aping" or imitating.
Only an Islamic, cultural, social, economic and political revolution can put an end to this moral and political decadence with which we are at present living.
As we see it, Islam and Arabism are one. I cannot envisage a deislamized Arabism or an anti-Arab Islam. Islam and Arabism are like mInd and body, Inseparable. The rise or decline of Islam always depends upon the strength or weakness of the Islamic Arab World.
Our people are Moslems and religious. But religion can perhaps be Interpreted in different ways. Like ideologies. One must make distinctions between ideas and their applications, between religions and the applications men give them. One must distinguish between Islam and the Moslems. When revolutionaires talk of Islam they understand it to be a radical revolution which not contradicts the Islamic revolution but is the foundation and origin of it and is also an Integral part. One cannot separate the revolutIon from Islam. Trying to separate Islam from the revolution in the Arab world is to create an obscurant "Islam" à la Saudi Arabia. One must understand that the people and the peasants in the Islamic feudal tyrannic monarchy in Morocco do not have the protection of religion as they did from the Catholic Church In the Europe of the Middle Ages. In our country there is no Church or caste of priests. On the contrary, in Morocco, every revolution was an Islamic one. The Algerian revolution was called the Moulahadirie revolution (the Marxists, on the other hand, were against it from the beginning as were the French Communist Party).
Islam is a revolution. All religions, at the beginning, are revolutions for social justice, human dignity and liberty.
Q: What do you think of the good relations which exist between Morocco on the one hand and the USSR and China.
A: It is sad that the world's two largest socialist countries, the Soviet Union and China, have betrayed their role in their domestic and foreign policies. They have become arms merchants. The Soviet Union, like the USA, sells weapons to most dictatorships, for example to Hassan II. It sells them to everyone. The "Moroccan Communist Party", whose strategy is dictated by the Soviet Union, has become an objective ally to Hassan II. These regimes have become large vulgar powers Interested In great powers. The Islamic revolution Is part of the world revolution. The pole of world revolutIon Is no longer the Soviet Union or China but shows a tendency of going more and more towards the Third World. The Soviet Union and China are betraying their role, they are only fighting amongst themselves to increase their zones of influence in the Third World. Despite everything they are a part of the world revolution to counterbalance American imperialistic hegemony. They make mistakes but with "self-criticism" they can rectify and better help the repressed nations of the Third World. Let's hope so!
Q: When you say that the Moroccan revolution is a part of the world revolution you seem to liwist on the Moroccan revolution as belonging to the Arab revolution rather than the African revolution. What do you say to this ?
A: Geographically, Morocco Is part of Africa but culturally we belong to the Islamic and Arab world. If you mean the black non-Islamic Africa it is cut off from us. It is called either English or French speaking, etc (why not African speaking?!). Africa, as Ren6 Dumont said, "is badly divided". In the North of Africa we have succeeded in safeguarding our personality and In freeing ourselves from Intellectual colonialism. We are part of Africa but we are also a part of the Third World. But when I speak of Islamic and Arab unity, I am not speaking of something new which has to be created. I am speaking of a unity that existed, that exists In the popular awareness and which is only to be restored. But we would also like unity with Africa: but let us begin with cultural and linguistic unity. It is the tendency of the people to unite. IBut with Africa it is more a matter of creating something new. An effort must be made to abolish the cultural, political and geographical desert which separates us. Today, simply to fly from Dakar to Rabat one must often fly through Paris. Politically and culturally one must also often go through Paris. But a problem, even today, is the presence of cultural colonialism in Africa. Algeria has remained "French" for a hundred and fifty years, but it doesn't call itself French speaking. The borders between the Arab countries are artificial and cultural unity has existed for a long time now. I do not oppose Islamic and Arab unity against unity with Africa, I am only saying that in the former case there exists a unity to be restored, which has previously existed and which ideologically, linguistically, spiritually and politically exists between the Arab countries. We Arabs are only split by the present regimes to rule better over us. Any Instituting of a democratic, legitimate and representative regime in an Arab or African country is a large step towards unity of the peoples. The present conflicts and animosities are the work of dictatorial and neo-colonialist regimes intent on division to make their ruling easier. They are non-representative and illegitimate regimes. They are regimes which represent neo-colonialism and all the Interests that go with It.
AN 'ACCIDENT' TO FORESTALL A COUP
(Published in the London magazine "Africa Now", in March 1983)
When Morocco"s absolute monarch, King Hassan II, was tip-off that his only general was plotting a coup. he lost no time In silencing him, according to an officer in the underground movement interviewed by "Africa Now".
General Ahmed Dlimi, King Hassan's right-hand man and commander of the Moroccan army's southern forces did not die in a car accident as alleged by the regime. He was tortured and then shot after the CIA informed the King that DImi was planning a military coup to overthrow the monarchy in July this year and replace It with a democratic Arab Islamic Republic of Morocco.
At a secret hideout in Sweden, Lieutenant Ahmed Rami, a leader of "Le Mouvenent des Officiers Lilr'res", the under-ground movement of Moroccan army officers dedicated to overthrow the King, told "Africa Now" that General Dlimi was called to King Hassan's palace in Marrakesh at 11 o'clock at night on January 23, 1983. There, 10 security men escorted him to an underground interrogation room. At 1 a m, two American officers arrived with the King and went into the interrogation room for some hours. At 5 a